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EVEN MORE PARODIC THAN THE REAL THING:'
PARODY LAWSUITS REVISITED
By Bruce P. Keller" and Rebecca Tushnet*··
I. INTRODUCTION
An article focusing on a copyright decision initially may
appear out of place in the pages of The Trademark Reporter®. Yet
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,l in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a parodic, transformative use of a copyrighted
work, even if commercial, could qualify as a fair use, is quite
significant for trademark lawyers. As a practical matter, parody
cases increasingly involve copyright as well as trademark claims,
so practitioners often encounter both within the same case. As a
doctrinal matter, Campbell also has proved legally significant in
trademark cases because the free-speech concerns underlying
protection for parodies apply no matter what law is invoked
against them. Campbell is thus a good illustration of the
unexpected effects that Supreme Court decisions often have when
the generalist Court tries its hand at the occasional intellectual
property case.
One of Campbell's most significant-and unsatisfying-effects
has been to elevate parody as a favored form of literary or artistic
comment and devalue satire. Several courts have since explicitly
relied on the distinction between these two forms of humor to
impose liability on those who have created the latter, even though
the actual language from the Court's opinion counsels a more
sensitive approach.
This is a troubling trend, for at least two reasons. First, the
distinction between parody and satire is too fine for courts (not
generally recognized as great connoisseurs of humor) to make.
Second, the parody/satire distinction simply is not responsive to
the considerations that underline copyright law's fair use doctrine,
including First Amendment values served by satires as well as
parodies.

*
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This article sets forth the context in which the parody/satire
distinction arose in Campbell, then examines how it has been
applied in subsequent copyright, trademark, and right of publicity
cases. Briefly stated, our review shows that factually similar
copyright cases have reached wildly divergent results, which
illustrates Campbell's analytical limits. Insofar as trademark law
is concerned, the bias created in favor of parodies may well have
made things worse by· making secondary the only proper question
in a trademark infringement case: whether a particular use is
likely to cause consumer confusion. In recent right of publicity
cases, by contrast, courts have steered away from the parody/satire
distinction, but have not uniformly replaced it with a coherent
analysis.

II. CAMPBELL AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
In Campbell, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the owner of the copyright
in Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman." The defendants, the rap
group 2 Live Crew, had recorded a song called "Pretty Woman"
that used some of Orbison's music and a twisted version of his
words. The Sixth Circuit had held that 2 Live Crew's commercial
use-the song was on an album being sold to the public-made its
appropriation presumptively unfair. The Supreme Court, however,
declared that copying for profit did not give rise to a presumption,
much less a conclusion, against fair use where that use was
"transformative." In Justice Souter's words,
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose
fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand
for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The
later words can be· taken as a comment on the naivete of the
original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that
ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it
signifies. 2
The Sixth Circuit could be forgiven for presuming that a
commercial use was an unfair use; after all, the Supreme Court
said exactly that in 1984. 3 Under Campbell, however, commercial
use is less important than the extent to which the accused work
adds something new to the origina1. 4 Not every change is
"transformative" for fair use purposes: The· alleged fair use must

2. Id. at 583.
3. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) ("[E]very
[unauthorized] commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.").
4. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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not be merely a derivative work. 5 The Court distinguished between
simply adding new material and adding new material that reflects
on the original work. A parody, which makes the' original work its
target, is particularly favored, while a satire, which uses the same
work to criticize something else, is not. According to the Court, this
is out of a concern that the satire may be using a preexisting work
simply to "avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh."6
In the Supreme Court's analysis, a finding of transformation
necessarily pervades the analysis of the other statutory fair use
factors: the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
substantiality of the portion of the copyrighted work used, and the
effect of the defendant's use on the market for the copyrighted
work. 7 The nature of the copyrighted work is not particularly
important in a parody case because parodies almost invariably
playoff of highly expressive, creative works, or they risk failing in
their purpose. 8 The amount and substantiality of the portion of the
copyrighted work used also have to be judged differently than in
cases of nontransformative use. A parody needs to evoke at least
enough of the original to identify its target. Often this will mean
use of the "heart" of the work-the expressive elements that are
most closely associated with that work. Parodies of Hemingway's
style,9 Tolkien's imagined worlds,lO Star Trek characters' signature
phrases,l1 and the like all may use substantial portions of the
original and still imbue those portions with transformative value. 12

5. The Copyright Act of 1976 grants copyright owners the exclusive rights to authorize
"derivative works," defined as any form in which a work may be transformed, recast or
adapted; film versions of movies are classic examples of derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. §
106(2). Parodies, if they take enough of an original work, qualify as derivative works, as do
satires and other kinds of reuse that add new material to the underlying copyrighted work.
6. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
7. The four factors set forth in the Copyright Act are: (1) the purpose and character of
the use (a factor taking into account both whether the use is commercial and whether it is
transformative); (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the use in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use on the
market for the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
8. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
9. Hemispheres magazine, for instance, runs an International Imitation Hemingway
contest as well as a Faux Faulkner contest. The authors' styles are easy to recognize and
thus attract more parodists than other famous authors' more workmanlike prose. Cf
Sun Trust Bank u. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (Marcus,
J., concurring) (quoting Ernest Hemingway's complaint that "Parodies are what you write
when you are associate editor of the Harvard Lampoon. The greater the work of literature,
the easier the parody.").

10. See, e.g., Harvard Lampoon Staff et al., Bored of the Rings (1969).
11. Hear The Firm, Star Trekkin', on 2 Dr. Demento 20th Anniversary Collection: The
Greatest Novelty Records of All Time (1991).
12. See Campbell, 510 U.s. at 588 ("When parody takes aim at a particular original
work, the parody must be able to 'conjure up' at least enough of that original to make the
object of its critical wit recognizable. What makes for this recognition is quotation of the
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Once the parody has used enough of the original work to ensure
recognition, how much more copying will be allowed will depend on
the other fair use factors, particularly whether the overall purpose
is to parody the original. 13 How parodic the parody really is-that
is, the extent to which it transforms and criticizes the originalaffects the extent to which it is likely to serve as a substitute for
the original, usurping the copyright owner's legitimate market. 14
Campbell took its vision of transformative fair use from an
article by Judge Pierre Leval, in which he proposed that fair use be
redefined as requiring that the use be "productive" and "employ
the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose
from the original."15 The concept of "productive" use, which serves
the purpose of copyright law by increasing the store of knowledge,
already had some currency before Campbell.l 6 To take a core
example, it was accepted that traditional critical scholarship and
reviews-nonfiction uses that shed new light on the works they
discuss-were protected by fair use. 17
Of Campbell's contributions, therefore, two were the most
significant. First, the Court's opinion appeared to embrace the
supremacy of the transformative use inquiry over all other factors,
as Judge Leval advocated. IS Another way to describe Campbell's
version of fair use is to say that, once the transformative use
determination is made, all the other factors fall into place behind
it. 19
.
Second, and relatedly, Campbell drew a line between parody
and satire, identifying the former as a favored type of
transformative use and the latter as likely to be an unnecessary
original's most distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the
audience will know.") (citations omitted).

13. See id.
Id. at 591 ("[W]hen ... the second use is transformative, market substitution is at

14.

least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred. Indeed, as to parody
pure and simple, it is more likely that the new work will not affect the market for the
original in a way cognizable under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it ....")
(citations omitted).
15. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990).
16. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 480 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985);
New Era Publ'ns Int'l, ApS v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1990);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966).
18. See Leval, supra note 15, at Ull (arguing that transformation should be the
primary determinant of whether a use is fair); id. at 1124 (arguing that a use that does not
harm the copyright owner's market should still be deemed unfair unless the use is justified
under the first statutory factor).

19. See, e.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (,,[Ojnce a work is determined to be a parody, the second, third, and fourth
factors are unlikely to militate against a rmding of fair use.").
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use of another's copyrighted work. Before Campbell, courts used
the terms interchangeably to refer to categories (or a category) of
work likely to constitute fair use. 20 Indeed, our research has not
found any pre· Campbell case using parody and satire to draw
presumptive lines between fair and unfair uses,21 though courts
did consider, under other rubrics, the extent to which a burlesqued
work was used simply to get the audience's attention with a
familiar text.
In fact, Justice Souter's Campbell opinion is careful to avoid
any bright· line rule, including one condemning all satire. Although
the text of the opinion suggests that satire can stand on its own
two feet and thus has less of a claim to fair use than parody,22 a
footnote points out that the more important question is whether
20. A nonexhaustive list of cases treating parody and satire as equivalent in copyright's
eyes includes Rogers u. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,309·10 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Parody or satire, as we
understand it, is when one artist, for comic effect or social commentary, closely imitates the
style of another artist and in so doing creates a new art work that makes ridiculous the
style and expression of the original."); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g
Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989) (book found to be fair use marketed as "satire";
court uses "parody" and "satire" interchangeably); MCA, Inc. u. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 184
(2d Cir. 1981) (relying on defendant's lack of intent to create "burlesque or satire" to find no
parody and no fair use); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600
F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979); Walt Disney Prods. V. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th
Cir. 1978); Berlin u. E.G. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[Als a general
proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom-both as
entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism."); Anheuser.Busch, Inc. u.
Balducci Publ'ns, 814 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Mo. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 769
(8th Cir. 1994); New Line Cinema Corp. U. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517,
1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. U. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642
F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Pacific & S. Co. V. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1195
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (satire and parody are "recognized forms offair use"), affd in part and reu'd
in part on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1490 (lIth Cir. 1984); Pillsbury CO. V. Milky Way Prods.,
Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Elsmere Music, Inc. V. National Broad. Co., 482 F.
Supp. 741, 745 (S.D.N.Y.) (using terms interchangeably and quoting 3 M. Nimmer, Nimmer
on Copyright § 13.05(C), at 13·60-61 (1979) ("[T)he disparity of functions between a serious
work, and a satire based upon it, may justify the defense of fair use even where substantial
similarity exists."», aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. V.
Showcase Atlanta Coop Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 356-62 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Loew's Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 181 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (discussing copyright treatise
that explicitly equated satire and parody), aff'd sub nom. Benny V. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532
(9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
The same phenomenon occurred in trademark law. See, e.g., Uniuersal City Studios,
Inc. V. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1984); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, 467 F. Supp. 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y.) (defining "parody" and "satire"
separately, as in Campbell, and treating both as fair use), aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. V. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. ~982), lumped the two together in discussing
exceptions to the right of publicity. See id. at 492-93.
21. To the contrary, Berlin V. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964), found Mad Magazine lyrics, to be sung to Irving Berlin tunes,
to be fair use even though the object of the humor was not Berlin's songs but the "idiotic
world we live in today." Id. at 542.
22. Campbell V. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994).
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the accused work risks substituting for the original or licensed
derivative works. 23 According to that footnote, when there is "little
or no risk of market substitution," both "looser forms of parody"
and "satire" may be fair use. 24
Unfortunately, Justice Souter's nuanced reasoning has been
overlooked in most post-Campbell cases; instead, some courts have
relied on the easier wholesale parody/satire distinction, placing on
it an importance far out of proportion to its origins and benefits. As
the next three sections discuss, copyright and trademark cases
have suffered most as a result, while right of publicity cases have
more clearly recognized the disutility of the distinction (though
right of publicity jurisprudence has troubles of its own with
transformative use).

III. CAMPBELL'S EFFECTS ON COPYRIGHT CASES
We begin with an analysis of the impact of Campbell on
copyright cases. As noted, humorous unauthorized uses of
preexisting works often can involve copyright, trademark, the
right of publicity or privacy and false advertising claims in the
same case. 25 Moreover, the problems of Campbell in copyright
litigation provide important lessons counseling against its
reflexive extension to trademark and right of publicity law. The
central lesson to be drawn from the copyright cases is that,
although the parody/satire line has become quite significant, the
demarcation between parody and satire is not always clear. First,
as a practical matter, the distinction is far too malleable in the
hands of a capable practitioner or judge to be of much use. Second,

23. Id. at 580 n.14.
24. Id. Though Justice Souter is here speaking of copyright, one could imagine similar
reasoning applied to trademark cases, in which factors supporting a minimal likelihood of
confusion (such as audience sophistication and purchaser care) could justify greater
similarity between a mark and its humorous imitation.

25. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003);
Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999), affg 14 F. Supp. 2d 947
(N.D. Tex. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 140506 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997); MasterCard Int'[ Inc. v. Nader 2000
Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Kane v. Comedy Partners, 68
U.s.P.Q.2d 1748 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings,
Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F.
Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Williams v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 961
(C.D. Cal.), vacated by consent, 1999 WL 1260143 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1999). The district
court in American Family Life Insurance Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio
2002), a case involving political commercials that imitated an insurance company's mark,
seems to have misunderstood this overlap, stating that a copyright infringement claim
required evidence that the original work and the accused work were so similar that the
accused work was likely to cause confusion among consumers as to sponsorship,
endorsement, or other affiliation. See id. at 689 (quoting trademark confusion standard from
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987».
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and perhaps more important, the distinction between the two is
not responsive to the considerations that justify fair use and the
free speech concerns underlying fair use.
A. Line-Drawing Problems
A fundamental flaw of the parody/satire divide is that there is
no true division. 26 Mad Magazine,27 which routinely lampoons both
society and particular cultural phenomena with caricatures of
movies and celebrities, is a good example. 28 "Weird AI" Yankovic's
creative output provides further examples. "(This Song's Just) Six
Words Long"29 is a parody of "I Got My Mind Set on You" by
George Harrison because it mocks the mind-numbingly repetitive
lyrics of the original. Is his song "King of Suede,"30 about a clothing
salesman, a parody of "King of Pain" by The Police? Arguably, the
song pokes fun at the self-important angst represented by "King of
Pain" and its singer, a contention no less plausible than the idea
that 2 Live Crew's rap song attacked the naIvete of Roy Orbison's
"Oh Pretty Woman" with lyrics identifying the targeted woman as
an ugly prostitute. 31
To take another example, the musical Avenue Q is, as
everyone involved acknowledges, a takeoff on Sesame Street using
very similar puppets and even former Sesame Street puppeteers.
As Time described the premise,
26. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch
Silenced a Parody, 45 J. Copyright Soc'y 546, 557 (1998) (noting that "many literary
scholars argue" that it is ''both foolish to attempt and impossible to achieve" a true
dichotomy between satire and parody).
27. See Mad Magazine, http://www2.warnerbros.comlweb/madmagazinelhome.jsp
(visited Mar. 6, 2004) (containing images from recent issues and various past movie
parodies/satires). Is Our World Really All That Different from the Matrix?
http://www2.warnerbros.comlmadmagazine/fileslonthestandslots_436/matrix.html, for example,
uses The Matrix to mock rapper 50 Cent, Geraldo Rivera and Viagra.
28. Rochelle Dreyfuss has informed one of the authors that her late colleague, Alan
Latman, who wrote a major report on fair use to Congress before the enactment of the 1976
Copyright Act, spoke of the "Mad Magazine exception," and based many of his conclusions
on the proposition that what Mad Magazine did was, by definition, not copyright
infringement.
29. "Weird AI" Yankovic, Even Worse (Scotti Bros. 1988) (containing, along with many
repetitions of the title, lyrics such as "Couldn't think of any lyric sINo I never wrote the
lyrics/So I'll just sing any old lyricslThat come to mind, child").
30. ''Weird AI" Yankovic, In 3-D (Scotti Bros. 1991) (''There's a sale on our gabardine
suits todaylThey're all thirty percent off from yesterday/.../Well, I never made it past the
second gradellt took all of my life for me to learn this tradelBut my friends are all thinking
that I've got it madefCause I'm known the world over as the King of Suede .... ").
31. In his Campbell concurrence, Justice Kennedy points out that "Just the thought of
a rap version of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or 'Achy, Breaky Heart' is bound to make
people smile." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). He cautions, however, against allowing such "weak transformation" to count as
fair use. Id.
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What if the denizens of Sesame Street grew up into profane,
broke, self-doubting college grads who kept some of their
innocence but developed potty mouths? ... There's Cookie
Monster's alter ego, Trekkie Monster, who is addicted to
Internet porn, and a pair of sexualized Ernie and Bert
characters, Nicky and Rod, who room together but don't sleep
together .... 32
Parody or satire? Like pre-Campbell courts, theater reviews
eschew the distinction, noting that Avenue Q addresses recent
college graduates' fears about adult life (satire) through obvious
references to Sesame Street characters (parody).33 Indeed, one of
the creators has stated that his motivation for basing the musical
on Sesame Street-like puppets was to get younger audiences'
attention,34 which could also be called "avoiding the drudgery of
working in something fresh."35 The producers are fortunate that
Sesame Street has decided not to use that admission against them
in litigation.
For those who have not taken the time to sample these forms
of humor, four post-Campbell reported opinions illustrate the
limits of line-drawing in this area, showing how subjective and
fuzzy the line between parody and satire can be. Two movie
advertisements and two books stood accused of copyright
infringement; one of each fended off the claim with a successful
parody/fair use defense.
In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Miramax Films
Corp.,36 the owners of the copyright in the movie Men in Black and
the poster used to promote it sued Miramax, distributor of The Big
One, a Michael Moore documentary about the human casualties of

32. Kate Betts, Puppet Regime: Toys Really Are Us in the New Musical Avenue Q, Time,
Aug. 11, 2003, at 62; see also Jesse McKinley, To Producers of ''Avenue Q" Puppets Now
Mean Profits, N.Y. Times, May 1, 2004, at B15 (similar description).

33. See, e.g., Elysa Gardner, "Q" Takes a Witty Ride Down "Sesame Street," USA Today,
Aug. 4, 2003, at 4D (using both terms); Jake Tapper, Is This Town Big Enough for Two
Puppet Boulevards? N.Y. Times, July 27, 2003, sec. 2, at 5 (same); Charles Isherwood,
"Avenue Q" Re·Routed to Broadway, Variety, Aug. 4, 2003, at 29 (stating that show "co·opts
the style of a tyke TV show to animate the aimless lives of underemployed
twentysomethings looking for love and fulfillment," which would sound like satire after
Campbell).
34. Blake Green, "Avenue Q"'s Creators Grew Up on 'Sesame Street' and the Muppets,
But Their Creations Are Decidedly Not Aimed at Children, L.A. Times, Aug. 3, 2003, Part 5,
at 34 ('"We needed a way in [to appeal to young people],' says Lopez, who repeats a friend's
observation about 'Avenue Q'; 'It's how you're sneaking in under the radar."').
35. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. Cf. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So
Fair About Fair Use? 46 J. Copyright Soc'y 513, 517 (1999) (pointing out that satire may not
be a way of avoiding hard work; "lilt's easy enough to spew a few lines of impromptu
[Sleussian doggerel, but it takes some creativity and work to write a sustained satirical
pastiche that people will enjoy enough to pay money for and recommend to their friends").
36. 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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corporate America's focus on profits. Miramax's posters and movie
trailer drew on Men in Black by imitating its advertising slogan
("Protecting the Earth from the scum of the universe" became
"Protecting the Earth from the scum of corporate America"), the
visual arrangement of its advertising poster and several notable
elements from the poster.
The court rejected Miramax's argument that the trailer for
The Big One poked fun at Men in Black by suggesting that an
average, out-of-shape documentarian could assume a heroic role.
The court found that the poster and trailer could not reasonably be
perceived as commenting on or criticizing the ads for Men in Black
that they imitated. 37 The other fair use factors were no more help
to Miramax, and the court found infringement .
. In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,38
the plaintiff brought suit alleging both copyright and trademark
infringement against the publishers of a book written and
illustrated in the style of Theodor S. Geisel, or "Dr. Seuss" as he
was more commonly known. The book, The Cat NOT in the Hat! A
Parody by Dr. Juice, commented on the murder trial of O.J.
Simpson, making fun of the proceedings in rhyming doggerel,
illustrated by numerous pictures of a cat and his distinctive
striped stovepipe hat.
In its copyright analysis, the court concluded that The Cat
NOT in the Hat! was best described as satire. Although the book
mimicked Dr. Seuss's distinctive style, it did not hold that style up
to ridicule. 39 The defendants argued that they had cast O.J.
Simpson as the mischievous Cat in that he and his defense team
committed "tricks" and other acts contrary to moral and legal
authority, creating a horrible mess. (The original Cat in the Hat
was a Classic trickster figure, who created chaos to the delight of
young children but left them with quite a mess to explain to
adults.) The court rejected this defense as "'pure shtick'" and
'''completely unconvincing."'4o
The reasoning--{)r really, the announcement of a conclusionin those two cases elides some troubling questions. Copyright law
generally instructs courts not to pass judgment on the aesthetics of
a work. 41 Yet distinguishing parody from satire requires aesthetic

37. Id. at 1187. See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 900
F. Supp. 1287, 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (rejecting the parody defense when a car commercial
took numerous elements from James Bond character and films; copying unnecessary to
parody action film genre).
38. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997).
39. See id. at 1401.

40. Id. at 1403 (quoting district court opinion).
41. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 300 (1903) ("It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
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and literary judgment that the copied work is not in any way a
target of criticism, and, in particular, it is far from clear that the
Dr. Seuss court's view was correct. Perhaps Dr. Seuss's charming
Cat is a bad guy, contrary to Dr. Seuss's sympathetic portrayal, by
analogy to another charming rogue who may have gotten away
with murder owing in part to his lawyers' Seussian flourishes. 42
Perhaps it is not desirable to laud people (or cats) whose charm
substitutes for good behavior. In any event, the court did not, and
probably could not, explain why it was any less reasonable to
perceive a criticism of Dr. Seuss's blithe paean to trouble making in
The Cat NOT in the Hat! than to perceive a criticism of Roy
Orbison's naIve portrait of street life in 2 Live Crew's "Pretty
Woman." Given that fair use is an important outlet designed to
reduce the tension between copyright and First Amendment
interests,43 the "chilling effects" of such a fuzzy distinction should
be of concern, and we should distrust the courts' ability to draw the
right line.
Now contrast these results with those reached in two other
significant fair use cases that found parody, rather than satire, in
two arguably similar texts. The first case involved a well-known
cover of Vanity Fair showing actress Demi Moore in a profile that
emphasized the beauty of her pregnant body; the pose recalled
classical portrayals of the goddess Venus. 44 Paramount Pictures,
promoting its upcoming film Naked Gun 33 113: The Final Insult,
starring Leslie Nielsen, copied Annie Leibovitz's Vanity Fair
photograph for the film poster, with the small difference that a
diamond ring on Moore's hand was replaced with a tacky,
obviously fake ring and the large difference that Paramount's
version used Nielsen's head on top of a pregnant woman's body.
Nielsen's jaw and eyes were positioned at roughly the same angle
as Moore's, but whereas her gaze was serious, his was smirking.45

themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation .... At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to
a public less educated than the judge.") (Holmes, J.).
42. E.g., ''If it doesn't fit, you must acquit." See Ochoa, supra note 26, at 591-92 ("By
placing O.J. Simpson in the Cat's hat, the authors not only comment on Simpson's evasion
of responsibility for his actions, but they also subtly suggest that the Cat in the Hat may be
seen as a sinister and dangerous figure, instead of the merely mischievous character
depicted in the original work.").

43. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219·20 (2003).
44. See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d' Cir. 1998).
45. See id. at 111-12. Leslie Nielsen was also involved in the other successful defense of
a humorous advertisement against copyright infringement claims: He played the bunny in a
beer commercial mocking the form of Eveready's "Energizer Bunny" commercials. See
Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1991). As the
Eveready court noted, Nielsen is known for his comic acting in movies that often contain
substantial parodic elements. [d. at 443 n.7. These cases suggest that an advertiser

HeinOnline -- 94 Trademark Rep. 988 2004

Vol. 94 TMR

989

The court determined that the poster was clearly
transformative, in that it added something new to the copyrighted
work. Whether it commented on the original, as parody must, was
a closer question. Ultimately, the court believed that, "[b]ecause
the smirking face of Nielsen contrasts so strikingly with the
serious expression on the face of Moore, the ad may reasonably be
perceived as commenting on the seriousness, even the
pretentiousness, of the original."46 As a result, the fair use factors
weighed in Paramount's favor. 47 Nonetheless, out of the obvious
concern that every copier could claim to "comment" on an original,
the court emphasized that the very seriousness of the original
photograph invited humorous deflation. 48
The most significant copyright parody/fair use dec,ision since
Campbell is Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin CO.,49 which
provoked national attention and discussion about the role of the
First Amendment in copyright cases. Briefly, Sun Trust concerned
a book, The Wind Done Gone, that took characters and settings
from Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind and retold the story
from the perspective of a new character, Scarlett O'Hara's
illegitimate, mulatto half-sister. Overall, the notable feature of the
retelling is that the white characters appear as ineffectual, stupid,
or otherwise flawed, whereas the black characters are intelligent
and active, in vivid contrast to their respective portrayals in Gone
With the Wind.
Although the district court granted a preliminary injunction
against publishing the book, the Eleventh Circuit granted
expedited review and, at the conclusion of oral argument, lifted the
injunction from the bench. The district court had found that there
was no need to use Gone With the Wind to criticize slavery and the
romanticized view of the antebellum South, which was (part of)
The Wind Done Gone's goal. Randall's book simply used wellknown characters to draw attention to her version of the story. As
a result, the work was a satire and a sequel, not a parody, and had
no legitimate claim to build on Margaret Mitchell's copyrighted
work.
The court of appeals, by contrast, held that the proper focus of
the "parody" inquiry was whether the aim of the accused work was
"to comment upon or criticize a prior work by appropriating

interested in increasing its chances of a successful parody defense might wish to call Mr.
Nielsen's agent.

46. Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 114.
47. Seeid. at 115-16.
48. Id. at 114-15; see also Campbell, 5lO U.S. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(expressing similar concern and arguing that burden on defendant to show parodic
character should be significant).
49. 268 F.3d 1257 (llth Cir. 2001).
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elements of the original in creating a new artistic, as opposed to
scholarly or journalistic, work."50 The court found that The Wind
Done Gone plainly acted as a "specific criticism of and rejoinder to
the depiction of slavery and the relationships between blacks and
whites" in Gone With the Wind. 51 From the conclusion that The
Wind Done Gone was a true parody, the lifting of the preliminary
injunction inexorably followed.
The lesson to be learned from these four cases is that the
distinction between parody and satire is in the eye of the presiding
judge. It may be that the subjectivity involved in judging the type
of transformation at issue leads some courts to keep their analysis
brief, or nonexistent, 52 perhaps implicitly recogmzmg that
distinguishing parody from satire as a legal matter is a custom
honored more in the breach than in the observance. For example,
at least two artists who altered the BARBIE character's image by
placing her in sexually explicit contexts have survived
infringement allegations. 53 In their opinions, the courts wasted
little ink concluding that sexualizing BARBIE is a comment on
BARBIE.54 This task may have seemed easy because, as one artist
who works through the BARBIE image suggests, "Barbie is quite a
loaded symbol. Put a Barbie next to just about anything and
meaning will rear its ugly head. This little pink lady is just too
well known ...."55 Thus, potentially any unauthorized use of the
BARBIE character could be interpreted as critical and
transformative.
In another case, a man in a chicken costume whose act
incorporated taunting and assaulting BARNEY (the large purple
dinosaur) prevailed on summary judgment because the court found
that his act commented both on the BARNEY character's pervasive

50. ld. at 1268·69.
51. ld. at 1269. The court, and Judge Marcus in concurrence, also noted that The Wind
Done Gone contained homosexuality and miscegnation, two things the Mitchell estate would
never allow in any authorized derivative work. This also favored a finding of fair use. See id.
at 1270 n.26; id. at 1282 (Birch, J., concurring).
52. Professor Goldstein has argued that some courts have a similar propensity to
declare nontransformative uses to be transformative in order to justify a finding of fair use.
See Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. Copyright Soc'y 133, 139 (2003).

53. See Mattei, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment against pro se defendant; finding that BARBIE head on doll
body dressed in "bavarian bondage dress" was transformative; "[tlo the Court's knowledge,
there is no Mattei line of'S&M' Barbie"); Mattei, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d
792 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant who displayed
photos, some sexually suggestive, of BARBIE dolls posed with kitchen appliances).
54. See, e.g., Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 802 (displaying the BARBIE image in
ridiculous and/or sexual situations critiques her); Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
55. The Distorted Barbie (available at http://www.detritus.netlprojectslbarbie/why.htm)
(visited Apr. 22, 2004).
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commercial presence and on his lovable, "sissy" image. 56 The·
district court held that the BARNEY character's presence at a
sporting event was a comment on its pervasiveness: "Even the
Chicken cannot get away from Barney."57 Then, the court stated,
"[t)he parody ... moves to another level as the lovable, sissy
Barney character transforms into an egotistical urban
rapper .... "58 The court did not explain what is parodic here or
what lessons one ought to learn about the original from viewing
the burlesque, implying that any role reversal would be parodic.
The animated pornographic film Starballz also avoided a
preliminary injunction as a parody of the Star Wars style. 59 In this
case, the full discussion was as follows: "Starballz is a parody of
Star Wars, in that it is a 'literary or artistic work that broadly
mimics an author's characteristic style and holds it up to
ridicule.'. .. Lucasfilm is not likely to succeed in its copyright
claim because the parodic nature of Starballz may constitute fair
use."60
Interestingly, the one court to address the issue of whether
consumer reaction can determine the parodic or satirical nature of
a work rejected consumer survey evidence purporting to show that
an infringing work's parodic character could not reasonably be
perceived by its audience. 61 Instead, the court held that whether a
work is a parody is a question of law, because parody is "an
objectively defined rhetorical device"62 that should not be subject to
a majority's potentially censorious views but should be entrusted
to a court. Curiously, and apparently seeing no contradiction, the
court immediately followed this conclusion by quoting Justice
Holmes's caution, reiterated in Campbell, that "it would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work)."63
Apparently, the court saw no contradiction in making itself the

56. Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Tex. 1998), afrd, 179
F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999).
57. Id. at 955.

58. Id.
59. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Cal.
2002).

60. Id. at 901 (citation omitted).
61. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 801. But see Mattei, Inc. v. Robarb's, Inc., 2001
WL 913894 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2001) (holding that survey evidence showing a high level of
consumer confusion as to source weighed against fair use because the confusion showed that
there was no transformation "into a substantially new product that merits protection").
62. Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 801.
63. Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582·83, itself quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)) (alteration in original).
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judge of the subtle shades of meaning in a work whose merit it was
not qualified to judge.

B. Practical Slipperiness
The subtle literary divide between parody and satire becomes
even more obscure when lawyers enter the picture. It should not be
especially difficult, in most cases in which a copyrighted work is
somewhat altered, to adduce testimony that the changes are, at
least in part, a parody, attacking elements of the original. When "a
fertile imagination or a literature degree"64 can define a work as
parody instead of satire, we should be unsurprised that lawyers
possessed of one (or both) can manipulate the distinction.
The controversy over The Wind Done Gone is illustrative. It
was marked by self-serving testimony on both sides, identifying
Alice Randall's work as parody in a distinct Mrican-American
tradition or failing to find any humor in the book. 65 Randall's
publisher revised the book jacket in order to label it a parody, a
step that more likely reflected legal tactics than a marketing pitch
to readers interested in parodies. 66 In fact, before Campbell,
humorous works often called themselves "satires"; now the
preferred word is "parody."67
The Eleventh Circuit reacted to the battle of the experts in
SunTrust by apparently dismissing both positions and articulating
its own view of the extent to which The Wind Done Gone was a
valid critique of themes in Gone With the Wind: "[T]he parodic
character of [The Wind Done Gone] is clear. [It] is not a general
commentary upon the Civil-War-era American South, but a

64. 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[C][2], at
13·217 (2002).

65. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.23 (11th Cir.
2001); Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1373·74 & nn.8·11
(discussing competing expert opinions on presence or absence of parody in Randall's work)
(N.D. Ga.), rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). On SunTrust's side, experts included Joel
Conarroe, president of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fund and himself a former
Guggenheim fellow; Alan Lelchuk, a novelist; Gabriel Motola, emeritus professor of English
at CUNY; and Louis Rubin, Jr., emeritus professor of English at UNC·Chapel Hill. On
Houghton Mifflin's side, the roster included Pat Conroy; Henry Louis Gates, Jr., chair of
Afro·American studies at Harvard; Harper Lee; Barbara McCaskill, professor of English at
the University of Georgia; Toni Morrison; and Anton Mueller, senior editor at Houghton
Mifflin. Their affidavits and declarations, and many more, can be found at
http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.comlfeatures/randaILurl (visited June 16, 2003).
66. See Sun Trust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.
67. Compare id. and Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1396 (9th Cir.) (book's subtitle was A Parody by Dr. Juice), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146
(1997), with Cliffs Notes, Inc. u. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
493 (2d Cir. 1989) (book found to be fair use marketed as "satire"); Berlin u. E.C. Publ'ns,
Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1964) (analyzing Mad Magazine's self· described "satire"
and finding fair use).
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specific criticism of and rejoinder to the depiction of slavery and
the relationships between blacks and whites in [Gone With the
Wind] ."68 The district court in the same case, however, had
accepted the Mitchell Estate's characterization of the work as a
mere sequel and satire on antebellum Southern society:
Ms. Randall does not seek to simply criticize the treatment of
black Americans in Gone With the Wind's fictional time but
also to comment upon the treatment of black Americans in the
South in the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's as well as today. A
parody, however, does not gain protection of the fair use
doctrine if it merely uses the protected work as a means to
ridicule another object .... [T]he book's overall purpose is to
create a sequel to the older work and provide Ms. Randall's
social commentary on the antebellum South. 69
As the two opinions show, it will rarely be difficult to make
arguments that any particular fictional or artistic transformative
use is a satire or a parody, depending on one's side.
In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures, 70 similar wordplay
occurred. Paramount's executive Vice President for Creative
Advertising stated that she believed that the Naked Gun 33 113 ad
"'lampooned the controversial and "serious" Moore Photo, [and]
was perfectly in keeping with the Naked Gun brand of irreverent
parodic humor."'71 Other defense testimony claimed that "[f]rom
the outset, [the ad] was intended to make a mockery of an image
that had become a 'cultural icon."'72 Although the court of appeals
noted that there was no evidence that the person who created the
ad was aware that Naked Gun 33 113 in fact dealt with themes of
pregnancy and childbirth,73 the claim of parody proved fatal to
Leibovitz's case. Nonetheless, she could plausibly have claimed
that, like Justice Kennedy's example of a rap version of "Achy
Breaky Heart," the ad was merely a grotesque version of the
photograph that added no critical insights. 74
Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 75
provides an equally subjective evaluation. The opinion discusses
68. Sun Trust, 268 F.3d at 1269; see also id. at 1269 n.23 (rejecting reliance on
"assistance from 'experts"').

69. SunTrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1377·78 (footnote and citation omitted).
70. 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), afrd, 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).

71. Id. at 1216.
72. Id. at 1221.
73. See Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 111.

74. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599 ("Almost any revamped modern version of a familiar
composition can be construed as a 'comment on the naivete of the original.' ... Just the
thought of a rap version of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or 'Achy Breaky Heart' is bound to
make people smile.") (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted) .
75. 320 F. Supp. 2d 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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the use of modified lines from the famous song "What a Wonderful
World," and takes pains to emphasize that alteration of the tone,
lyrics and musical features makes the use a parody of the original,
a commentary "on the innocence reflected in the lyrics of the
original, in order to drive home its own message [that the world is
corrupted with crime and drugs] more effectively."76 By contrast,
the court asserts, uses of the same song over images of a corrupt
and dystopian world constitute commentary on the world, not on
the song. 77 This distinction is, to put it mildly, not self-evident;
shifting the depiction of corruption from sound to vision still leaves
us with a naIve song in a cynical world.
C. Conceptual Flaws in the Parody/Satire Distinction
Assume for argument's sake that observers generally will be
able to agree that an accused work is a parody or a satire. That
still does not make the distinction particularly useful for
determining whether the work is a fair use. A literary label is less
important than consideration of the four fair use factors taken
together.
A rare example of the proper analysis is Kane v. Comedy
Partners, which did not rely on literary terms to make legal
judgments. 78 In Kane, The Daily Show, a Comedy Central staple,
mocked cable television's public access channels with a segment
called "Public Excess." To illustrate its view of the "merits" of
public access television, it used a brief clip from The Sandy Kane
T. V. Show, a public access program hosted by a former stripper
and comedienne whose signature song is "I Love Dick." That clip
was used to introduce the "Public Excess" segment and also
incorporated into a commercial promoting The Daily Show. Kane
sued for infringement.
In its fair use analysis, the court acknowledged that, "unlike a
parody," Comedy Central's use did not alter a "famous work" for
the purpose of commenting on it. It found that the only similarity
between parody and Comedy Central's use was "the element of
ridicule." The court seems to mean that quoting, as opposed to
rewriting with the addition of new material as in Campbell and
Sun Trust, cannot properly be described as either parody or satire.
Nevertheless, it was the ridicule that counted; the "derisive
commentary" made the use transformative. 79

76. Id. at 90.
77. See id. at 92.
78. 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1748 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
79. Williams v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 961 (C.D. Cal.), vacated by
consent, 1999 WL 1260143 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1999), also followed Campbell's more nuanced
approach. Williams involved a "spirit message" from an Army unit that was broadcast
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The other notable feature of Kane was the court's marketplace
effect analysis: The plaintiff was apparently willing to license
parodies and other critical uses; she just wanted to be paid. 80
Finding that her desire for compensation could not be taken into
account because it risked a troubling circularity in the analysis,
the court instead held that Comedy Central's critical use did not
run a risk of supplanting the original, and thus would not harm
the plaintiffs market. 81
Kane points to a serious weakness in current legal treatment
of parody. Historically, courts have given parodies more leeway
than satire, based in part on the notion that copyright owners are
unlikely to develop a market for authorized parodies that, unlike
satire, poke fun directly at the copyright owner's work. 82 Because
the market effect prong of the fair use analysis finds harm only
when the defendant's use affects markets that copyright owners
are reasonably likely to develop,83 parodies fare better than satire
under this factor.
The fatal flaw in this logic is that "parody" is not a good proxy
for "markets that copyright owners are unlikely to develop,"
especially when it is juxtaposed with "satire."84 The fundamental
during the 1997 Army-Navy football game. The message showed an animated clay "Sailor
Bill" experiencing trauma at the hands of the Army. The court rejected a parody defense,
finding that "Sailor Bill" did not comment on the misfortunes of the copyrighted clay
character "Mr. Bill," but merely showed a clay figure suffering similar harms. Nonetheless,
the court accepted a fair use defense, because the other factors, particularly the effect on the
market, did not favor the plaintiff. See id. at 970; see also MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader
2000 Primary Comm. Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (relying on Campbell's
statement that less parodic content is required where the likelihood of market substitution
is low).

80. See Kane, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1752.
81. See id. at 1753.
82. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 ("[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works
will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from
the very notion of a potential licensing market. 'People ask ... for criticism, but they only
want praise."') (quoting Somerset Maugham, Of Human Bondage 241 (penguin ed. 1992»;
Sun Trust, 268 F.3d at 1270 n.26 (holding that parody's references to homosexuality and
miscegnation took on "special relevance" to the market·harm analysis, favoring fair use,
because evidence showed that copyright owner would not license any works making such
references) .
83. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)
("only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets" are relevant to market·
effect analysis) (citing Campbell); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int7, Ltd., 996
F.2d 1366, 1377 ("In the cases where we have found the fourth factor to favor a defendant,
the defendant's work fIlled a market niche that the plaintiff simply had no interest in
occupying."); cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (''The market for potential derivative uses
includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others
to develop.").
84. Moreover, satire is just as unlikely to substitute for the original as is parody: no
child would demand (or accept) The Cat NOT in the Hat! instead of The Cat in the Hat. Yet,
after determining that the defendants' use was not "transformative" because it was satirical
rather than parodic, the Dr. Seuss court went on mechanically, and preposterously, to
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premise that copyright owners will not create or license parodies of
their works is belied by marketplace evidence. Sandy Kane is not
alone in licensing her work for parodies. 85 DC Comics' "Elseworlds"
consist of numerous alternate versions of Batman, Superman and
other superheroes, including several storylines in which the
superheroes become supervillains and others played for laughs. 86
DC also publishes Bizarro Comics, self-described parodies of
Superman, Wonder Woman and the rest drawn by cartoonists such
as Matt Groening, creator of The Simpsons. 87 Its rival Marvel,
meanwhile, teamed up with Archie Comics to bring the brutal
crime-fighter The Punisher to the idyllic world of Archie, Betty,
Veronica and Jughead. 88 Copyright doctrine tells us that a comic
book that makes Lex Luthor a brave hero fighting a dangerous
Superman is a good candidate for a fair use-protected parody. DC,
however, is ready, willing and able to make money off of it. 89
Similarly, "Weird AI" Yankovic, known for humorous reworkings of
popular songs such as "Eat It" (from Michael Jackson's "Beat It")90
and "Like a Surgeon" (from Madonna's "Like a Virgin"),91 has a
practice of asking for, and a history of receiving, permission from

conclude that it would likely substitute for the original. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146
(1997).
85. See Sun Trust, 268 F.3d at 1279 n.3 (Marcus, J., concurring) (''The irony and selfawareness common in contemporary literature, in particular, may one day pose difficulties
for the fair use doctrine. It is not hard to imagine a copyrighted story that parodies itself, by
design, or an author who makes a career out of parodying his own work in each subsequent
one.").
86. See, e.g., Batman: Crimson Mist (2001) (Batman is a vampire); Batman: I, Joker
(1998) (Batman is the bad guy, the Joker is the hero); Superman Inc. (1999) (Superman is
an athletic superstar and media hound); Superman/Wonder Woman: Whom Gods Destroy
(1997) (Superman is turned into a teenaged girl-not, incidentally, for the first time in his
long and tangled history); Legend of the Dark Mite, in Batman: Collected Legends of the
Dark Knight 84 (1993) (Batman is a dwarf with magical powers).
87. See Bizarro Comics! (2001).
88. See The Punisher Meets Archie (1994) (the subtitle reads The Crossover You've Been
Dreading/).
89. See Man of Steel: Lex Luthor (forthcoming 2004); Matt Brady, Brian Azzarello
Talks Lex Luthor (available at http://198.65.99.89/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=
5044) (visited Apr. 22, 2004) (quoting DC Comics writer who states that "I'm trying to
change people's minds about Superman .... Luthor might have a point, and maybe he's
right."); see also John M. Ford, How Much for Just the Planet? (1987) (official Star Trek
novel that parodies conventional Star Trek plots); Electronic OtherRealms, Winter 1987,
available at http://www.plaidworks.comlchuquildownloads/OtherRealms/19-08.txt (visited
Sept. 20, 2003) ("The last people you would expect to publish a parody of Star Trek would be
Pocket. Pocket, however, has .... [The result is] one of the most bizarre plots you'll ever
see.").
90. "Weird AI" Yankovic, "Weird AI" Yankovic in 3-D (Way MobyNolcano 1984).
91. ''Weird AI" Yankovic, Dare to Be Stupid (Way MobyNolcano 1985).
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copyright owners, even though he has strong parody/fair use
arguments for at least some of his songs. 92
In fact, as an economic matter, authorized parody makes even
more sense for a multimedia conglomerate that owns many kinds
of intellectual property. Scary Movie, produced by Dimension
Films, is in large part a parody of Scream, produced by Dimension
Films. 93 AOL-Time Warner, which owns the Hanna-Barbera
cartoon Space Ghost, also produces a parody, Space Ghost Coast to
Coast, that puts the former hero in the role of a talk show host.
Fox News Corporation nearly sued itself over a Simpsons parody of
Fox News, but reason prevailed at the last minute and the parody
went unchallenged. 94 Taking these developments to their natural
conclusion, some lawyers now advise copyright owners
affirmatively to develop and license parody markets, so that they
will be able to show market harm should their works be parodied
without a uthoriza tion. 95
Authorized parody is an instance of the ever-present risk of
circularity in market harm analysis: Without an external limiting
principle, all uses harm copyright owners' markets, in the sense
that the copyright owner could always be paid for every use. 96 The

92. See Frequently Asked Questions-and the Answers! http://www.weirdal.coml
faq.htm ("Al does get permission from the original writers of the songs that he parodies.
While the law supports his ability to parody without permission, he feels it's important for
him to maintain the relationships that he's built with artists and writers over the years.")
(visited Mar. 13, 2002); Chuck Miller, ''Weird AI" Yankovic: Polkas, Parodies and the Power
of Satire, at 4, http://members.aol.comlboardwalk7Nankovic.pdf (visited Oct. 30, 2003)
(noting that one writer of "I Love Rock and Roll" not only approved the parody "I Love Rocky
Road," but helped Yankovic find a producer); see also Dan Strack, Gaijinity, Ltd. Presents
the Music of Dan Strack (available at http://www.gaijinity.com/parodylyrics.html) (noting
that the Rolling Stones granted permission for parody in return for royalties, resulting in
the Japanese·influenced ''I Can't Get Noh Satisfaction"); Kurt Cobain: The Lost Interview
Part 2, http://www.guitarworld.comlartistindexl9611.cobain.html (visited Mar. 13, 2002)
(discussing Nirvana-approved parody of "Smells Like Teen Spirit," "Smells Like Queer
Spirit").
93. See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law 151 n.12 (2003) ("Universal Pictures, which produced Abbott and
Costello Meet Frankenstein, was the owner of the three earlier horror films that it spoofed.")
(citing Don Harries, Film Parody 19 (2000». The owners of the James Bond copyrights and
trademarks also dropped their objection to the title Austin Powers in Goldmember, as part
of a deal to get trailers for Bond movies shown before the Austin Powers movie. See The
Gold Standard: Member v. Finger, N.Y. Post, July 23, 2002 (available at 2002 WL
22355859).
94. See Fresh Air, Oct. 23, 2003 (available at 2003 WL 56730786) (interview with The
Simpsons creator, Matt Groening).
95. See Jay Flemma, The Wind Done Got Away With It, http://www.alanbergman.coml
parody. pdf, at 11 (n.d., visited Aug. 12, 2003) ("[Tlhe client should explore the benefits of
entering into favorable parody licensing arrangements and other derivative markets....
This 'use it or lose it' analysis of derivative markets could grow to encompass parody
licenses.").
96. This circularity has been repeatedly noted. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v.
Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 520
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limiting principle generally offered to support parodies is that,
because society is better off when people can freely parody other
works, the market for parody should not be monopolized by the
copyright owner.
If this is so, then the parody/satire distinction becomes even
more mysterious. Just as society is better off when people can
parody existing works, it is better off when people can freely
satirize them. 97 It is said that no satirist needs to start with a
copyrighted work in order to achieve that goal, but that argument
is extremely weak. A parodist could also in theory always parody
something else. Moreover, courts generally are unwilling to
suppress speech because it might have been said another way: If a
speaker believes that certain words or images are the most
effective way to communicate, a court has little business
disagreeing with him or her. That is why the Supreme Court
protected Paul Cohen's right to wear a jacket proclaiming "Fuck
the Draft" in public: "(W]e cannot indulge in the facile assumption
that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."98 Thus, a
satire may provide a uniquely effective social commentary whose
effect could not have been achieved in a completely new work or a
satire of a public domain work. 99
U.S. 1156 (1997); Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 150 F.3d 132, 145 n.ll (2d Cir. 1998); American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1,21 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995).
97. The public's interest in having access to broad-sweeping satires might, if anything,
be greater than that in having access to parodies of more limited cultural relevance. It is
this, rather than the range of derivative works a copyright owner might authorize, that
provides the proper baseline for determining the copyright owner's legitimate markets. See
Carol Publg, 150 F.3d at 145 n,l1 (assuming that most copyright owners would not license
parodies, but noting danger of allowing copyright owners to define their own markets); see
also Leibovitz u. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[Tlhe fair
use doctrine is broad enough to protect even those commentaries that are not so damaging
that the original author would refuse to license them for a fee. A parodist need not
demonstrate that the copyright owner would prohibit the use in order to qualify the copy as
fair use under Campbell.")

98. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); see also Meyer u. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,
424 (1988) (First Amendment protects individuals' right "not only to advocate their cause
but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means to advocate their cause");
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 675 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[Als we know from the example of publishing houses, movie
theaters, bookstores and Reader's Digest, communication occurs in selecting which speech
to copy and distribute no less than in creating the speech in the first place.").
99. See Kozinski & Newman, supra note 35, at 517 ("Even if the original work is used
only as a vehicle, not just any vehicle will get you where you want to go .... When·this kind
of satire really works well, it's because there is something about the original that fits-or
pointedly doesn't fit-the subject"; giving example of a character playing Paula Jones
singing "Don't Cry for Me Judge Scalia," with its evocation of Evita Peron); Robert P.
Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in
Copyright, 21 AlPLA Q.J. 305, 311 (1993) ("a parodist's choice of a particular weapon ... is
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In short, the "unlikely licensing" argument never made much
sense as a way to explain why parody in particular, but not satire,
can be fair use. No uptight copyright owner is going to authorize
derivative works that satirize society at large while refusing to
authorize parodies of the copyrighted work itself.lOo

D. Conclusion
The parody/satire distinction is difficult to make, may lead to
the suppression of constitutionally protected speech and lacks a
logical connection to the economic justification for copyright. It
should be abandoned in favor of a fair use analysis that finds
addition of critical insights-about the original work or society in
general-to be favored uses, without judging the merits of those
insights. There are no easy answers in fair use law; attempting a
shortcut by way of the parody/satire distinction has led courts into
error.

IV. CAMPBELL'S EFFECT ON
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CASES
Campbell's application has not been limited to copyright.
Courts increasingly have analyzed trademark parodies using a
variant of the Campbell fair use test,101 although a judge's
subjective reaction to an alleged parody may still be as important
as any enunciated principle of law. In fact, reliance on Campbell to
aid trademark infringement analysis tends to obscure the ultimate
issue in any infringement case: the likelihood of confusion. This
section explains how Campbell has been partially imported into

not accidental"); Ochoa, supra note 26, at 596-97 (arguing that works under copyright,
which are more current than most public domain works, may be better targets for parody
because they are better known, and that the choice of a particular work to parody is an
artistic decision worthy of respect).

100. See Kozinski & Newman, supra note 35, at 518; Merges, supra note 99, at 311;
Ochoa, supra note 26, at 610-11 (criticizing the idea that copyright owners might license
satires more readily than parodies and relating instances of satirists denied permission to
use copyrighted works because copyright owners fear association with the satirists' views).
101. See, e.g., Mattei, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying Campbell's requirement that parody must target the original); Harley·Davidson,
Inc. v. Orottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]hatever protection is to be afforded
a trademark parody must be informed by the Supreme Court's elucidation in the copyright
context of parodies allegedly protected by the defense of fair use."); Elvis Presley Enters.,
Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 199 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[R]ecently .. , the Supreme Court
considered parody in the copyright context, which is relevant to the treatment of parody in
the trademark context."); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1406 (9th Cir.) (finding that ''The Cat NOT in the Hat!" was parody, not satire), cert.
dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997); see also Gary Myers, Trademark Parody: Lessons from the
Copyright Decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring
1996, at 181.
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trademark infringement cases, with special attention to the
doctrine of nominative fair use, which is based on related concerns
for freedom of speech. It also briefly examines trademark dilution
cases, which have, perhaps oddly, not been much affected by
Campbell.

A. Parody and Satire in .
Trademark Infringement Cases
As in copyright, the parody/satire divide is unhelpful in
addressing the central question in trademark infringement cases:
whether the defendant's use is likely to cause confusion among a
substantial number of consumers. If a joke is recognizable as a
joke, consumers are unlikely to be confused, and whether the butt
of the joke is society at large, or the trademark owner in
particular, ought not to matter at all.1 02
An additional wrinkle is that trademark owners, like
copyright owners, are increasingly willing to authorize activities
that could be understood as mocking the mark,lo3 One recent
example is that of "rivalry figurines" that show one university
team's mascot beating up on a caricature of another team's mascot;
Georgia fans may buy a figurine showing a large Georgia bulldog
mauling a tiny Florida 'Gator, while Florida fans may buy the
opposite figurine. 104 Both schools authorized the use of their
mascots.

102. See, e.g., MasterCard In!'l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
1046 (using standard likelihood of confusion test and holding that evidence that viewers got
the joke could not support Ii finding of confusion); Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News America Publ'g
Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that identifiable "jest or commentary" is
unlikely to cause confusion); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (same); 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 31:155, at 31·261 (4th ed. 2002) ("If the difference in wording or appearance
of the designation together with the context and overall setting is such as to convey to the
ordinary viewer that this is a joke, not the real thing, then confusion as to source,
sponsorship, affiliation or connection is unlikely."). Courts have also been willing to find
infringement when there does not seem to be any joke to get. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding preliminary injunction
against an herbal antidepression product, HERBROZAC, that capitalized on the fame of
PROZAC), and when a motorcycle mechanic used an altered version of the HARLEY·
DAVIDSON logo in his own logo. See Harley·Davidson, 164 F.3d at 812-13 (affirming
judgment against defendant based on use of confusingly similar logo; applying Campbell to
trademark context and finding that defendant's use made no comment on plaintiffs mark).
103. But see Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: First Amendment
Limitations on the Trademark Estate, 87 TMR 48, 62 (1997) ("Given the dearth of self·
parody in this world, however, the danger of confusing the subject of a parody with its
author seems remote at best .... ").
104. See
Old
World
Traditions
Collegiate
and
Christmas
Collectibles,
http://www.oldworldtraditions.neticataiog.php?action=110&cat_id=663 (visited June 25,
2004). Rivalry merchandise is an expanding market:
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This trend not only makes it more difficult for consumers to
tell when "jokes" are unauthorized, it also further erodes the
parody/satire distinction. These trademark owners clearly are
parodying themselves rather than satirizing society, perhaps in
order to attract the attention of irony-loving consumers.l° 5 Even
aside from cases of self-mockery, the labels of parody and satire
can be particularly unhelpful and distracting when trade dress is
at issue because those terms usually are applied to writings rather
than, for example, a rubber version of an HERMES bag. lOG
To take an example from a recent case, it is difficult to discern
any conceptual or even practical advantage in characterizing Tshirts that caricature pro wrestlers as dogs as "parodies" of the
World Wrestling Federation, rather than as satire.lo7 It is a fair
question to ask how it would even be possible to parody pro
wrestling. In the case of the wrestling dogs, the court felt
compelled to opine that, with "dogified" T-shirts, "we are reminded
that we are free to laugh at the images and associations linked

[Tlhere's a growing demand for "rivalry merchandise" in which ... "two schools allow
their trademarks to appear on the same item, even if one team is being throttled,
humiliated or labeled as a loser." ... Why would schools agree to such a practice?
Money. The two schools share the revenue that the merchandise makes and often
argue that it simply highlights the traditions of their rivalries. According to Ron
Bohler, licensing director of Memory Co., the market leader in nonapparel rivalry
products, "sometimes their logic is elusive." This year, rivalry products account for 15
percent of its sales, up from 5 percent in 2002.... 25 colleges have approved
merchandise that depict their mascots being boiled alive in soup pots.
Melissa Costa, Colleges Profit from 'Rivalry Merchandise,' U-Wire, Dec. 4, 2003. The Wall
Street Journal offered further information about the trend. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
school depicted as dominating gets more of the licensing revenue, because its partisans buy
more of the merchandise. Moreover, fans' tastes are leading sellers to push colleges to
license more explicit andlor more violent images, in part in order to compete with cruder
bootleg rivalry merchandise. See Jeffrey Zaslow, Colleges Get a Cut from Being Kicked When
They're Down: Sports Fans Snap Up Souvenirs of Winners Beating Losers; Mascot Boiled or
Grilled? Wall St. Journal, Nov. 12, 2003. Thus, trademark owners may be in the same
situation as copyright owners, able to claim that there is direct market competition between
authorized and unauthorized parodies. The Wall Street Journal recounts one situation in
which a Florida State Heisman Trophy candidate pleaded guilty to petty theft, and an
entrepreneur sold thousands of "Heistman Trophy" shirts to University of Florida fans.
When threatened by the colleges' licensee, the entrepreneur claimed First Amendment
protection for his parody, and no litigation ensued. See id.
105. The widely disparaged ''Make Seven·Up Yours" campaign for the soft drink is
another example of self-mockery, and perhaps self-tarnishment. See Steve Quinn, 7UP
Sales Down 15%, Exec Says, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 23, 2003.

106. See Ginia Bellafante, A "Satire" of a Classic Fails to Amuse the August House of
Hermes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 2003, at B8; see also Kate Betts, Cartoon Couture, Time, July
28, 2003, at 69 (labeling "Jelly Kellys" "tongue. in-chic"); Style Watch, People, Aug. 11, 2003,
at 115 (calling bags "whimsical" and "the season's classiest beach bag").
107. See World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
413, 418 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (graphic artist described "dogifying" as means to "satirize a given
entity by giving him big floppy ears, a big silly tail ...").
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with these icons."108 Given the nature of the entertainment
services offered by the WWF, who needs reminding?
A different court took a more realistic approach when it
discussed a comic character whose appearance and background
resemble the character portrayed in Charles Atlas bodybuilding
ads, but who used his newfound strength to be a misogynist bully.
It stated, "This court fails to discern a substantive difference
between 'surrealism' or 'irony' on one hand [as the plaintiff
described the defendant's character], and 'parody' on the other,
much less do we find them to be mutually exclusive."lo9 The court
went on to note that the character serves mainly as an implicit
criticism of other superheroes-that is, its critical force was not
directed mainly at Charles Atlas ads-and that such commentary
was "precisely the type of expression of ideas that the First
Amendment is designed to protect."110 As many courts facing
similar cases do, the court hedged its bets by running through the
ordinary confusion factors and finding that they favored the
defendant,lll while also suggesting .that the plaintiffs burden of
showing confusion was somehow higher than in an ordinary case
because of the First Amendment concerns involved. ll2
When courts do use the parody/satire distinction, they can
easily go astray. In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, the plaintiff convinced
the court that the defendants' infringement of copyright also
justified an injunction based on potential consumer confusion.
Analyzing the trademark claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that
parody is not truly a separate defense to trademark infringement,
but an explanation of why, in a particular case, a defendant's use
of a mark is unlikely to cause consumer confusion: If consumers
get the joke, they will understand that a humorous use is not
authorized by the trademark owner,l13 That is correct. The Ninth
Circuit, however, then went off track. Its earlier conclusion that
The Cat NOT in the Hat! was satire led it to deny that reasonable
consumers would get the (satiric) joke.
Another aspect of the problem with borrowing from Campbell
to decide trademark cases is that "parody" is just as subject to
manipulation by clever parties or courts in trademark as in

108. Id. at 446.
109. Charles Atlas, Ltd. u. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
110. Id.
111. See id. at 339-40 (holding that the absence of actual competition or bridging the
gap, the sophistication of comic buyers, and the long period of time without reported
instances of confusion indicated that confusion was not likely).
112. See id. at 337 (holding that First Amendment concerns justified tolerating some
risk of confusion).
113. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. u. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405-06 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997).
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copyright. In one case, the court was confronted with TIMMY
HOLEDIGGER perfume for dogs modeled on TOMMY HILFIGER
perfume. Although the defendant "had difficulty expressing the
parodic content of his communicative message," the court
concluded that "trademark parodies ... do convey a message. The
message may be simply that business and product images need not
always be taken too seriously .... "114 If that is all that is required
for a parody, almost anything could qualify, including what
another court might call "satire."
This indeterminacy proved significant in Elvis Presley
Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece,ll5 in which the district court and the
court of appeals disagreed on the significance of the defendant's
expressed desire to mock (yet pay homage to) the type of kitsch
evoked by the phrase "velvet Elvis." The district court determined
that "velvet Elvis" necessarily implied a certain type of tackiness,
distinct from the message conveyed by "Elvis" alone, and that use
of ''Velvet Elvis" as a parodic restaurant name was therefore
justified. 116 The court of appeals, however, found this to be simply
satire, because the defendant intended to make fun of pretentious
restaurants and of the time during which velvet Elvises were
popular, neither of which criticized Elvis directly.1l7 This seems a
very fine (albeit pomaded) hair to split. The real issue, whether the
name caused confusion, risked getting lost in the shuffle, though
evidence of actual confusion helped the trademark owner
considerably.
Because confusion is the touchstone, the obviousness of the
joke, regardless of its true humor value or categorization, ought to
be the dominant focus.1 18 Furthermore, because humor often is
premised on the recognition that the joke is on the trademark
owner, the standard likelihood of confusion factors, like the
copyright fair use factors, have to be applied differently in parody
114. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410,415
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir.
1987». But see Harley-Dauidson Inc. u. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999)
(requiring "comment" on mark, not merely humorous use).
115. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).

116. See id. at 195.
117. See id. at 200.
118. See, e.g., Kane v. Comedy Partners, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1748, 1753-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(finding no infringement when television show played a clip from another show because it
was "clear that someone else's work is being displayed and ridiculed"); Charles Atlas, 112 F.
Supp. 2d at 338-41 (finding that a comic showing a weakling turning into a bully after
bodybuilding was critical and therefore noninfringing and nondiluting); New York Stock
Exch., Inc. u. New York, New York Hotel, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 479, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(replica of the fac;ade of New York Stock Exchange, in casino with New York theme, and use
of name "New York Slot Exchange" on replica and "New York $lot Exchange" for players'
club, was whimsical and an obvious pun on similarities between gambling and stock
investing, and thus nonconfusing), affd in relevant part, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002).

HeinOnline -- 94 Trademark Rep. 1003 2004

Vol. 94 TMR

1004

cases. Just as parody may take the "heart" of a nonfactual, highly
creative work and still be a fair use, a joke may target a strong
mark without causing any confusion, even though copying a strong
mark usually weighs against a defendant. When a humorist
targets a strong mark, consumers can more easily discern whether
the mark owner is likely to have authorized the parody because
they know very well how the owner wishes its mark to be
portrayed. For that reason, in the case in which "The Famous
Chicken" battled a purple dinosaur who looked similar to the
BARNEY character, but was not kind, gentle and loving like the
"real" BARNEY, the court found that confusion was unlikely.1l9
Similarly, when Jim Henson Productions decided to add a
warlike, but ultimately friendly, puppet pig character named
Spa'am to its film Muppet Treasure Island, Hormel, the producer
of the processed meat product SPAM, sued for both infringement
and dilution. The Second Circuit reiterated that a parody of a
strong mark is less likely to be confusing than a parody of a weak
mark. 120 The appellate court also noted that the Muppets were well
known for parodies, which would increase the likelihood that
viewers would expect and get the joke. 121

B. Parody and the Problem of Nominative Fair Use
In addition to Campbell's parody/satire distinction, other
copyright concepts have crept into trademark cases. (Perhaps this
cross-fertilization is easier because parody often spawns both
copyright and trademark claims.) In the Lyons case, for example,
the court echoed the copyright fair use test when it noted with
approval that the Chicken "used the minimum necessary to evoke
Barney"-a purple dinosaur with the distinctive gait of BARNEY,
but none of the friends or songs of BARNEY.l22 A straightforward
trademark analysis would have focused solely on literal
similarities and dissimilarities between the marks, not on the
concept of minimal copying. That traditional focus, along with an

119. See Lyons P'ship, L.P. u. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1999), affg 14 F.
Supp. 2d 947, 952 (N.D. Tex. 1998). The plaintiff also argued that the BARNEY character
was not a necessary target of the Chicken's wrath, but the court disagreed because the
parody targeted BARNEY himself. See Lyons, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
120. Harmel Foods Corp. u. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 1996). The
presence of a variant of the defendant's house mark was also a factor: Spa' am's name would
only be used along with his picture and the title of the movie, decreasing the similarity
between SPAM and Spa'am. See id. at 503·04.
121. See id. at 503. In light of this observation, perhaps the best parody an advertiser
could come up with would star Leslie Nielsen and the Muppets. See supra note 45.

122. Lyons, 179 F.3d at 388; see also Lyons, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 955 (defendant did not
copy the full BARNEY costume, other characters, words, music, or songs from plaintiff's
works, which decreased the chance of confusion).
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analysis of the obviousness of the joke, seems much more helpful
in determining likely consumer confusion than an inquiry into
whether less copying could still have made the parodic point. Still,
as noted above, parody's deliberate copying does require somewhat
different treatment than the activities that normally give rise to
infringement litigation.
One particularly interesting way in which courts have dealt
with trademark parody is by employing the concept of nominative
fair use, which either supplements or supplants the traditional
multifactor confusion analysis. 123 Nominative fair use, a concept
devised by the Ninth Circuit, allows people to speak about
trademarked products without permission, as long as they satisfy
three criteria:
First, the plaintiffs product or service in question must be one
not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second,
only so much of the mark or marks may be used as IS
reasonably necessary to identify the plaintiffs product or
service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, m
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder. 124
For example, MatteI lost its infringement suit against the
record company distributing the Swedish group Aqua's novelty
song "Barbie Girl" (sample lyrics: "I'm a Barbie GirVIn a Barbie
WorldlLife is plastic, it's fantasticlYou can brush my hair, undress
me everywhere ....").125 The district court found that mocking
BARBIE and the plastic values she sometimes symbolizes was a

123. Some courts have suggested that nominative fair use is a replacement for confusion
analysis, such that the court need not consider other factors, even evidence of actual
confusion. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002), explicitly states that
nominative fair use "replaces" traditional confusion analysis, rather than "complement[ingJ"
it, and contrasts nominative fair use to classic descriptive fair use, which is not available as
a defense in the Ninth Circuit if there is a likelihood of consumer confusion. Id. at 1150-5l.
See also New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that nominative fair uses are uses "to which the infringement laws simply do not
apply"). The Second Circuit has used similar concepts to determine when a special test
should replace standard confusion analysis. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d
Cir. 1989) (holding that the Lanham Act applies to titles only where the public interest in
avoiding confusion outweighs the First Amendment, and that this occurs only when a title
has no artistic relevance to a work or is explicitly misleading as to source or content). Yet
courts have also refused to apply the nominative fair use test where common sense suggests
that confusion is more likely. See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th
Cir.1996).

124. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Mattel, Inc. u.
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 808-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (using the nominative fair
use test to determine that photographs of BARBIE that did not infringe Mattei's copyright
also did not infringe the BARBIE doll trade dress); MatteI, Inc. u. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1142·43 (CD. Cal. 1998), a/rd, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that
disclaimers were a favored way of establishing nominative fair use).
125. See MCA, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
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legitimate parody.126 The court then applied the nominative fair
use test and found the test satisfied because the song did not use
more of the BARBIE image than was necessary. In the music video
for the song and the CD packaging, for example, the singers did
not adopt the likeness of the dolls. 12'l The defendant did nothing
else to suggest association and even included a disclaimer on some
materials.
Although the result in the "Barbie Girl" case was correct, the
use of "reasonably necessary" in the second part of the test is
unsound, and has been discredited in copyright doctrine. As the
Second Circuit pointed out in another Lanham Act case, a
copyright parodist "is entitled 'at least' to conjure up the original
and can do more."128 Establishing a conceptual floor in the form of
"no more than necessary" is too vague and manipulable and does
not give sufficient leeway to free speech interests. The "reasonably
necessary" standard needs refining and possibly rephrasing.129
Limiting the extent to which the mark is used (and the number of
times it may be used) makes the most sense as applied to word
marks. For example, use of the distinctive COCA-COLA font is
much more likely to cause consumer confusion than use of "CocaCola" in Times New Roman. 130 Nonverbal marks such as the
famous COCA-COLA bottle, however, cannot be chopped up so
easily, and the nominative fair use test should be sensitive to the
differences between types of marks.
Instead of looking for "necessity," the nominative fair use test
should (and in practice often does) focus on whether the use is
excessive in relation to the defendant's purpose,131 as does the
copyright fair use test. It should also give special leeway to
nominative uses of images, as does the copyright fair use test. 132

126. See id. at 1136-40.
127. See id. at 1142 (setting forth elements of and rationale for nominative fair use
defense).
128. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publg, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.
1989).
129. See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1154 (noting that "[w]hat is 'reasonably necessary to
identify the plaintiffs product' differs from case to case").
130. See, e.g., New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 n.7; Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 1209, 1211 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
131: See, e.g., Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1153 (hol.ding that the defendant could use
photographs of Princess Diana, not just her name, in advertising its commemorative items
depicting Princess Diana, because photographs were necessary to identify her to the
broadest range of consumers); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that multiple repetitions of plaintiffs trademark in website wallpaper failed the
nominative fair use test, but simple use to identify the defendant's status as former
Playmate of the Year, even incorporated into defendant's advertising, was nominative fair
use).
132. See, e.g., Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 804 (suggesting in its copyright fair use
analysis that, while songs, video, and written works "are naturally severable," visual works
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When a defendant uses the mInImUm possible, such as an
unadorned reference to a mark, this by definition should not be
excessive because it is necessary for people to understand the
reference. 133 Yet more than the minimum can also be legitimate; in
a later BARBIE case, the Ninth Circuit agreed that images of the
entire doll could constitute nominative fair use, even though
BARBIE would have been identifiable by more fragmentary
images. 134 Likewise, repeating "Barbie" in a song's lyrics is
acceptable, even if repeating a word mark in background images
on a website advertising services is not. 135 The former is part of a
product, and a defendant's judgment about what to include in an
expressive product should be given more deference than its
judgment about how to advertise its products or services. 13G
Defendants should not have to worry that courts will disagree with
them about the minimum copying of a mark that is necessary to
discuss or criticize it. Examining whether the copying is
disproportionate would give more leeway in cases raising free
speech issues.

may require wholesale reproduction in order to comment on them); Ty, Inc. v. Publications
Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) (pointing out that copying part of a picture of a
BEANIE BABY would be useless in a guide to BEANIE BABIES and finding fair use of Ty's
copyrighted works).
133. This situation corresponds to the current formulation of the nominative fair use
test, yet it was not followed in Abdul·Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir.
1996), in which the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's finding of nominative fair use
when General Motors compared the plaintiffs successful athletic career with the award·
winning track record of its car. The plaintiff was not readily identifiable without use of his
name; General Motors used only his name (actually, a name he himself no longer used), the
absolute minimum possible; and it did nothing else to suggest endorsement. Literal
application of the nominative fair use test would have exonerated General Motors. Cf. MCA,
296 F.3d at 902 (''The only indication that Mattei might be associated with the song is the
use of Barbie in the title; if this were enough ... it would render Rogers a nUllity."). The
court's result may be defended on the ground that even the minimum may be too much
when an advertiser invokes a celebrity's accomplishments to tout its own product. The
public may be likely to perceive any such mention as an endorsement. See Abdul·Jabbar, 85
F.3d at 413 ("[AJ jury might find an implied endorsement in General Motors' use of the
celebrity's name in a commercial, which would not inhere in a newspaper poll.") (emphasis
added). If that is the case, however, courts should admit that the nominative fair use
defense is not available in classic advertising cases in which the reference to the mark is
purely laudatory, although that would increase the uncertainty surrounding the defense. An
even better response would be to make the presumption against confusion raised by a
successful nominative fair use defense rebuttable in classic advertising contexts
("commercial speech" under the First Amendment) such as that involved in Abdul·Jabbar,
while irrebuttable outside such contexts.
134. See Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 808·11.
135. The former was the situation in MCA, while the latter was the situation in Welles.
136. Cairns states that, where "the description of defendant's product depends on the
description of the plaintiffs product, more use of the plaintiffs trademark is 'reasonably
necessary to identify the plaintiffs product,'" 292 F.3d at 1154, but that formulation does
not explain the difference in outcome between MCA and Welles, both of which involved
multiple repetitions of a word mark.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the result in the "Barbie Girl" case,
but did not rely on the nominative fair use defense. Instead, it
invoked case law that states a special rule for titles, based on
publishers' First Amendment interest in identifying their literary
products. Under this rule, titles are protected against Lanham Act
challenges unless they are deceptive as to their contents (such as
relabeling War and Peace as The Official Barbie Songbook) or
confusingly similar to other titles. 137 Unlike nominative fair use,
this rule does not look to necessity, only to some minimal
relationship between the title and the work's content. In part
because of this line of cases, Fox's lawsuit against AI Franken for
incorporating its trademarked slogan "Fair and Balanced" in the
title of his recent book, Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A
Fair and Balanced Look at the Right, was just as unavailing in a
court of law as it was counterproductive in the court of public
opinion. 13s
The district and appellate court analyses in the "Barbie Girl"
case differ from standard trademark parody analysis, which uses
parody as a lens through which to view the likelihood of confusion
factors. Essentially, the nominative fair use defense creates a
shortcut for defendants who are using a mark to explain their own
products or services, while the special rule for titles gives extra
protection to books, movies and other products that consist of
speech protected by the First Amendment. It remains somewhat
unclear whether these tests are true substitutes for the standard
confusion analysis or simply another way of stating that confusion
is unlikely.l39 This vagueness stems in part from the judicial
tendency to rule for defendants on the dual grounds that the
defendant made a nominative fair use and that there was no
likelihood of confusion. 14D Nonetheless, as a matter of doctrine,
recognizing that these special-purpose tests are substitutes for
confusion analysis makes more sense of them; if they are true
supplements, there is no reason to go through such elaborate
analysis in the first place.

137. See MCA, 296 F.3d at 901·02; see also Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at S07 (applying
rule on titles and finding that the use of the BARBIE mark to identify photographs of
BARBIE was noninfringing).
13S. See Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., 2003 WL 232S1520
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2003) (denying preliminary injunction). Seven days after Fox filed its
complaint, a Google search of the key terms produced 1,670 results, mainly mocking Fox;
the ALLNEWS me on the WESTLAW database had 96 stories of similar bent; and
Franken's book, not yet released, was number one at Amazon.com. See also Phil Hirschkorn,
Fox News Loses Attempt to Block Satirist's Book, http://www.cnn.com!2003ILAW/OS/22/
fox.frankenlindex.html (posted Aug. 22, 2003; last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
139. See supra note 123.

140. See, e.g., Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150,1155 n.14.
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C. Parodies as Dilution

Campbell's focus on the social value of criticism seems
inherently to conflict with the idea of dilution through
tarnishment. As a result, one would have thought that it would
play a more prominent role in cases in which parodies were
challenged on dilution grounds. In fact, courts generally have
responded to parodies accused of dilution by ignoring the First
Amendment value of parodic commentary141 or by defining dilution
narrowly142 rather than by invoking Campbell-type First
Amendment concerns as providing special solicitude for parodies.
For example, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a rule that only
narrowly "commercial" speech-in other words, advertisementscan be diluting. 143 Many parodies will fall outside that category, as
will many other uses of trademarks to which owners might object.
Given the Supreme Court's apparent distaste for dilution,144 it
appears that most courts will continue to feel little need to borrow
from Campbell when analyzing dilution claims that are doomed on
other, simpler grounds.l 45

V. PARODY AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The expanding right of publicity often is joined with claims
asserted under the Lanham Act.l 46 It is not surprising, then, that
courts have incorporated trademark-like First Amendment and
fair use defenses into their right of publicity analyses, even though
confusion as to whether the plaintiff has endorsed the use of his or

141. See, e.g., New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. New York, New York Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d
550, 558 (2d Cir. 2002); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994); Kraft
Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949-50, 953 (N.D. Ill. 2002); WAWA, Inc.
v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aifd, 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997).

142. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996);
World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa.
2003); Tommy Hi/figer Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 422-23
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Tex. 1998), affd,
179 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1999).
143. See, e.g., Walking Mountain, 353 F.3d at 812; cf. MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader
2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a political
campaign ad soliciting contributions was noncommercial for dilution purposes); American
Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (reaching similar
result).
144. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
145. See, e.g., MasterCard Int7, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053-54 (holding that dilution claims
against parody campaign ad failed because ad was not "commercial" speech but political and
there was no evidence of actual or likely dilution); cf. Kane v. Comedy Partners, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d 1748, 1754 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing state dilution claim because, oddly
enough, there was no evidence of likely confusion).
146. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003).
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her image is not an element of the right of publicity.l47 This trend
has also affected the right of privacy, a cause of action associated
with the right of publicity. Thus, a model's right of privacy claim
failed when a parodist spliced scenes from a sexually suggestive
commercial in which she appeared with segments of other,
sexually explicit footage. According to the court, the parody
highlighted the exploitation of sexuality in the original commercial
and constituted critical commentary deserving First Amendment
protection. 148
If confusion is not required for a violation of the right of
publicity, asking whether consumers get the joke will not help
distinguish between legitimate and unlawful uses of celebrity
images. Generally speaking, an individual's publicity right is
violated simply when his or her image (or name or voice) is used
without authorization for commercial gain. Right of publicity cases
that challenge parodies thus often force a starker choice between
free speech and intellectual property law than standard trademark
and copyright cases.
This section focuses on two contrasting approaches to the
problem taken by the Tenth Circuit and the California Supreme
Court. The Tenth Circuit's analysis borrowed some concepts from
Campbell but ultimately was grounded in consumer protection law
as limited by the First Amendment. The California Supreme
Court, by contrast, freely adapted Campbell's endorsement of
transformative use as a way of dividing simple celebrity
merchandise from First Amendment-protected art: When the value
of the artistic contribution to a product outweighs the value
contributed by the celebrity image, there is no violation of the right
of publicity.
The Tenth Circuit's approach is far more sound because it
requires courts to do less of the art critic's job. In neither method of
analysis is the parody/satire distinction helpful;149 rather, as the

147. See Geary u. Goldstein, No. 91 Civ. 6222 (KMW), 1996 WL 447776, at *3 n.7, *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1996) (holding that, though implied endorsement was not required to
violate New York's statutory right of privacy, New York would exclude "satire" from scope of
law, relying in part on First Amendment interests at stake); see also Kane, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1754 (finding that a mockery of plaintiffs public-access television show was newsworthy
and thus outside the scope of New York's right to privacy, relying in part on free speech
interests).
148. See Geary, 1996 WL 447776. The court also rejected a defamation claim based on
its conclusion that no reasonable viewer could infer that the model consented to the parody,
a claim that strongly resembles a right of publicity claim. See id. at *1-3.
149. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003) ("The distinction between
parody and other forms of literary expression is irrelevant to the ... transformative test. It
does not matter what precise literary category the work falls into. What matters is whether
the work is transformative, not whether it is parody or satire or caricature or serious social
commentary or any other specific form of expression."); Comedy III Prods., Inc. u. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (holding that transformation "is not confined to
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California case in particular demonstrates, the trouble comes from
the broader question of defining acceptable "transformation." As
with popular copyrighted works and trademarks, celebrity images
may provide much of the inspiration for a new product, yet it may
be unwise and even unconstitutional to let the celebrity have a
monopoly over all such products.
The Tenth Circuit invoked the First Amendment to bar state
law and Lanham Act claims against Cardtoons, a producer of
parody baseball trading cards that sought declaratory relief
against claims by the Major League Baseball Players
Association. 150 The trading cards mocked players' public personae,
with a special focus on their substantial salaries. The Tenth
Circuit found that the cards were clearly parodies and thus would
not cause confusion as to sponsorship or association. 151 As noted,
however, the right of publicity confers protection against
commercial uses that do not involve consumer confusion as to
endorsement. Thus, the players still had a right of publicity action
after their Lanham Act claims failed.
The court nonetheless found that Cardtoons' social
commentary was protected by the First Amendment. 152 The
Players Association argued that rights of publicity are property
rights, and no one has a right to use another person's property to
engage in First Amendment-protected activity where adequate
alternative means of communication exist. Cardtoons could, for
example, poke fun at the institution of baseball with generic
images of baseball players. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, because
intellectual property, "unlike real estate, includes the words,
images and sounds that we use to communicate, and 'we cannot
indulge in the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substa'ntial risk of suppressing ideas
in the process."'153 Changing the images would change the parody
because Cardtoons was parodying particular players as well as the
institution of baseball, and generic images could not do that.
Parodies of celebrities, the court continued, are especially valuable
because of celebrities' (overinflated) role in modern society, where
they symbolize certain ideas and values. l54 Allowing the right of
publicity to prevent commentary would amount" to censorship.
parody and can take many forms," including "fictionalized portrayal" and "subtle social
criticism"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002).
150. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.
1996).
151. See id. at 967.
152. See id. at 970 (finding that the cards were not commercial speech under the First
Amendment, even though they were sold for a profit).
153. [d. at 971 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971».

154. See id. at 972.
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The Tenth Circuit then examined whether this suppression of
speech was justified by the social value of the right of publicity.
The court considered several economic and noneconomic
justifications for rights of publicity, and rejected them all as
reasons to enjoin Cardtoons' nonconfusing cards. 155 One part of the
court's analysis is notable for its relationship to arguments in
copyright: Celebrities, the court stated, are unlikely to authorize
parodies, and therefore protecting celebrities against unauthorized
parodies does not provide them additional economic incentives. 156
In current popular culture, this argument rests on shaky empirical
grounds, just as it does with copyright owners. Saturday Night
Live, to take an easy example, often gets celebrities to engage in
self-parody, willingly and sometimes even gleefully.
Although the California Supreme Court also professed
concerns about First Amendment freedoms, it ultimately proved
much more hospitable to right of publicity claims than the Tenth
Circuit, failing to examine the justifications for such claims in
sufficient detail. In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup,
Inc. ,157 the owner of the Three Stooges' rights of publicity prevailed
in a claim against Gary Saderup, who draws portraits of celebrities
.and reproduces them on lithographs and T -shirts.158 Recognizing
that its decision had potentially significant consequences for
artists who create representations of famous figures, the California
Supreme Court adapted the transformative use test from
Campbell to create a standard that would preserve the right of
publicity without violating the First Amendment. 159 The court
rejected the parody/satire division in favor of an inquiry that asks
whether an artwork "adds significant creative elements so as to be
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or
imitation." 160
.
Despite an extended discussion of the First Amendment value
of social, artistic and political commentary that uses celebrity
images,161 the court held that the California legislature had a
"rational basis" for creating a right of pUblicity that extended
beyond a right to control commercial endorsements to "exploiting
the value to be obtained from merchandising the celebrity's

155. See id. at 973-76
156. See id. at 974.
157. 21 P.3d 797 (CaL 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002).
158. See, e.g., http://www.popculturetoday.com/saderup (visited
http://www.kadinsky.com/saderup.htm (visited June 19, 2003).

159. See Saderup, 21 P.3d at 808.
160. Id. at 799.
161. See id. at 803-04.
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image."162 In order to limit the effect of such an expansive right of
publicity on free speech, however, the California Supreme Court
held that a work that both used a celebrity image and contained
"significant transformative elements" would be protected by the
First Amendment; only works that "take the form of a literal
depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly
trespassing on the right of publicity without adding significant
expression beyond the trespass," would violate the celebrity's
rights. 163
The court suggested that a subsidiary inquiry might be useful
if the extent of transformation was unclear: "DoD the
marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive
primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted?"164 Saderup's
charcoal drawings, the court determined, did not have the
necessary artistic extra element; his talent was "manifestly
subordinated to the overall goal of creating literal, conventional
depictions of the Three Stooges so as to exploit their fame."165 It
commented that Andy Warhol's lithographs, by contrast, did have
that extra element. 166
The California Supreme Court's attempt to save postmodern
art is quite unpersuasive. Andy Warhol, whose fame is sustained
largely by images such as Marilyn, Single Elvis, Blue Liz as
Cleopatra, and, of course, Campbell's Soup Cans, has been
considered a difficult case even before Saderup.1 67 Jane Gaines,
indeed, predicted Saderup's outcome-and demonstrated its
fundamental flaw-six years before the fact:
While it would be completely possible to argue that a larger
percentage of the artistry in the (mostly derived) works
[Warhol] produced was "taken" and a relatively small
percentage "added" by the artist, working as Warhol did,

162. Id. at 805.
163. Id. at 808.
164. Id. at 810. The court described this inquiry as "in a sense more quantitative than
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate
in the work." Id. at 809. One must wonder what measure the court intends other courts to
use in their "quantitative" analysis.
165. Id. at 811.
166. Id. at 809 (suggesting that Warhol's celebrity portraits constituted "subtle social
criticism" and "a critique of the celebrity phenomenon"); id. at 811 ("Through distortion and
the careful manipulation of context, Warhol was able to convey a message that went beyond
the commercial exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic social comment
on the dehumanization of celebrity itself.").
167. See, e.g., Tim Cone, "The Most Fascinating Kind of Art':' Andy Warhol and the Right
of Publicity, 64 Arts Mag. 25 (Jan. 1990) (title from Warhol's quote, "Being good in business
is the most fascinating kind of art"). Cone notes that Warhol was sued for violating John
Wayne's right of publicity in one of his silkscreens; the case was settled out of court. See id.
at 26.
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under the protection of the charmed art world, this issue was
held at bay. This art world charm made it possible for Warhol
to make the kinds of outrageous and offensive visual
statements ... that you or I would not be able to make if we
set up a small factory to produce Marilyn Monroe's image in
Day-Glo for discount merchandising chains such as Wal-Mart
and Revco.l 68
Even accepting the idea that Warhol's cachet added value to .
his lithographs beyond the celebrity image portrayed,169 it is
manifest that Saderup's cachet, though more limited, did so as
well. His lithographs cost more than standard photographic prints
or posters of stars; consumers evidently value the artistic quality
of Saderup's work in addition to the star power of his subjects.l7o
Under Saderup, traditional portraitists, photographers and likely
the unknown Warhols and Lichtensteins of the next generation
will be barred from using images free to looser hands. Or, courts
that want to find for artists, like courts that want to find for
humorists in copyright cases, will manipulate the definition of
"transformation" to suit their purposes.
In a case involving a portrait of Tiger Woods at the Masters
Tournament, for example, the majority and the dissent disagreed
on the application of the Saderup test.l 71 The majority considered
that the painting had "significant transformative elements"
because it "consists of a collage of images [of caddies, the Augusta
clubhouse, and six other golf greats] in addition to Woods's
image[,] which are combined to describe, in artistic form, a historic
event in sports history and to convey a message about the
significance of Woods's achievement in that event."l72 The
majority's rationale suggests that all that is required for

168. Jane Gaines, Reincarnation as the Ring on Liz Taylor's Finger: Andy Warhol and
the Right of Publicity, in Identities, Politics, and Rights 131, 143 (ed. Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns, 1995). Gaines notes that Warhol "engaged his mother to sign his works
and employed workers to render them," further distancing himself from the conventional
attributes of the value-adding artist. Id.
169. Warhol's cachet was not always so well established; initially, the value of his work
gained nothing from his reputation and was perhaps hurt by it. See, e.g., Ingrid Sischy,
Andy Land, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2003, Fashions of the Times, at 80, 84 (discussing the
stigma initially surrounding Warhol).
170. As Justice Holmes said in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903), "if [works] command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value,-it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value,-and the taste
of any public is not to be treated with contempt." Id. at 252. Cf Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903, 923-24 (2003) ("[N]ot all
nontransformative 'conventional celebrity images' are mutually interchangeable. I may not
want to see a standard print of Elvis hanging on my wall; I may want to see a Gary Saderup
charcoal drawing of Elvis, or someone's impressionist Elvis or pointillist Elvis.").
171. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publg, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).

172. Id. at 938.
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transformation is a backdrop, or a collage of several celebrities
together. 173 The dissenting judge, on the other hand, could see no
relevant difference between the portrait of Woods and the portrait
of the Stooges, and pointed out that there appeared to be direct
competition between the authorized and unauthorized images:
"[T]he rendition done by Rush is nearly identical to that in [an
authorized] poster distributed by Nike .... "174
The flaw of Saderup was that, though the court recognized the
irrelevance of the parody/satire distinction, it nonetheless
fashioned a Campbell-like transformative use test that has the
same
problems
of
subjectivity,
manipulability
and
unpredictability.175 Borrowing from copyright law rather than from
trademark law, which is a much closer analog to the right of
publicity, distracted the California Supreme Court from an
analysis of the interests served by right of publicity law.
The distinctions between the two approaches should not be
exaggerated. The Saderup and Cardtoons approaches are likely to
produce similar results whenever significant creative additions are
evident on the face of the accused artwork. 176 As a practical
matter, Saderup may just muddy the waters further. Ideally, any
(nonconfusing) artistic rendering-with the possible exception of
recordings of entire performances and candid photos-should be
protected from celebrity control. If this result is unacceptable,
courts need a better account of the state's interest in protecting
celebrities' rights to control the presentation of their images in

173. This concept is related to copyright's recognition of the creativity involved in
selecting, coordinating and arranging preexisting materials to create a compilation or
collective work; the author of such a work is entitled to protect his or her creative
contribution, which can be seen as a kind of transformation inasmuch as it puts existing
elements into a new context. See 17 U.S.C. § 103.

174. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 959 (Clay, J., dissenting).
175. Consider Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003), in which the California
Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision that, applying Saderup, had concluded
that summary judgment was inappropriate when two musician brothers, Johnny and Edgar
Winter, sued over a comic book series that portrayed Johnny and Edgar Autumn, "villainous
half-worm, half·human offspring born from the rape of their mother by a supernatural
worm." Id. at 476. This would seem obviously a protected lampoon, but the court of appeals
got entangled in the question of how much of the series' value depended on the presence of
the Autumn (Winter) brothers. Even though the California Supreme Court reversed, DC
Comics was forced into expensive litigation because of Saderup's ill·defined test for artistic
separability.

176. See, e.g., ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 937-38 (endorsing both cases); World Wrestling
Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 444·45 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(using both cases); Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding,
under both Saderup and more expansive protection for art under New York law, that
Barbara Kruger's collage using an image of a plaintiff looking through a magnifying glass
and the words "It's a small world but not if you have to clean it" was protected from a right
of publicity claim by the First Amendment); ct. Saderup, 21 P.3d at 809 (finding Cardtoons
consistent with its result).
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noncommercial speech, one that answers the Tenth Circuit's
criticisms of broad publicity rights. At all events, Campbell's
literary analysis is not much help in distinguishing between what
should be within a celebrity's control and what should not.

VI. CONCLUSION
Parodies can be funny or offensive. What is certain is that they
are frustrating, enough so that intellectual property owners may
litigate out of a sense of wounded dignity even when there is a
strong fair use defense. Because parody determinations are fact·
intensive-and sometimes dependent on a judge's response to their
humor or lack thereof-predictions remain extremely difficult. We
have no ready answer to this problem; we can only suggest that
the parody/satire divide has proved a frolic and detour ill suited to
proper intellectual property policy. Courts should take a broader
view of transformation when they address humorous (and
nonhumorous) unauthorized uses of works, marks or images.

HeinOnline -- 94 Trademark Rep. 1016 2004

